

How to Survive as a Soviet Dissident

Two Political Prisoners Write Guide, Say Lie to Authorities

B-10

MOSCOW, Dec. 19 (UPI)—Two Soviet political prisoners have produced a tactical handbook to guide dissidents subject to psychiatric examination. It recommends lying and submission to authorities.

The typewritten manuscript, titled "Handbook to Psychiatry for Dissidents," is circulating in Moscow and was made available to Western correspondents. It was written in prison by Vladimir Bukovsky and ~~Leonid Gluzman~~.

"Your fate depends on your ability to be immoral to people and organizations who profess the morality of a Hottentot," the book says. "There are

no grounds for hope in the conscience of doctors."

Bukovsky was sentenced in 1972 to 12 years in prison and exile for publicly charging that sane persons are put in Soviet mental hospitals. He is now in Vladimir Prison near Moscow.

Gluzman, a psychiatrist from Kiev, was sentenced to 10 years and is in a labor camp in Perm, near the Ural Mountains.

Dissident sources said the handbook was smuggled out of the prisons and copies were seized by the KGB secret police in recent searches of Moscow apartments. They said Bu-

kovsky and Gluzman risked reprisals by issuing the book.

The Soviet Union has denied that sane persons who protest aspects of Soviet life are committed to mental hospitals.

Recommending tactics for those being examined, the book says: "It is fatal to adopt the morality of the dissident—truth, sincerity, sympathy—because that would mean giving truthful replies to questions damaging to yourself." It would give the psychiatrist "the symptoms he needs."

The book advises dissidents to stress "that you have always been completely normal and average in every aspect of

your life," and are "not interested in philosophy, psychiatry, parapsychology, mathematics or modern art."

The best tactic is to say: "I wanted to be famous, become well known. I did not understand the full seriousness of the consequences, I did not realize I had gone too far, and so forth."

"Precisely these unseemly motivations are taken positively at the examination," Bukovsky and Gluzman said.

The book advises hospital patients to tell doctors about "the change in your former sick convictions" and use all other tactical methods. "In this and only in this is your hope of salvation."

DATE 12-20-74
PAGE B-10
SEARCHED ☒ INDEXED ☒
SERIALIZED ☒ FILED ☒
DEC 21 1974
FBI - NEW YORK
NEW YORK TIMES

SEARCHED ☒ INDEXED ☒
SERIALIZED ☒ FILED ☒
DEC 21 1974
FBI - NEW YORK
1007

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Soviet Dissident Sees Carter, Mondale

By Edward Walsh

Washington Post Staff Writer

President Carter met with for 10 minutes yesterday with Soviet dissident Vladimir Bukovsky, but the White House made no attempt to turn the encounter into a showpiece of the President's campaign for human rights in the Soviet Union and elsewhere.

Carter sat in for the last 10 minutes of a half-hour meeting between Bukovsky and Vice President Mondale, telling the dissident writer that he will forcefully advocate the cause of human rights.

"Our commitment to the concept of human rights is permanent and I don't intend to be timid in my public statements and positions," the President said.

"I want them to be productive and not counterproductive and also to assure that our own nation and countries other than the Soviet Union are constantly aware that we want to pursue the freedom of individuals and their right to express themselves," he added.

Bukovsky replied: "I understand the high honor that is being shown me by my being received in the White House and I understand in doing so your administration shows its respect for the movement I represent and the ideas we stand for."

The polite exchange of remarks through a State Department inter-

preter in the Roosevelt Room of the White House was relayed to reporters later by Al Eisele, Mondale's press secretary.

While Carter's meeting a leading Soviet dissident contrasted with President Ford's refusal to see dissident Soviet writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn last year, the White House made no attempt to highlight the event.

Bukovsky left the White House without speaking to reporters at his own request, according to Eisele. No official photograph of the meeting between the President and Bukovsky, usually a routine matter for presidential meetings, was released. Moreover, the brief time Carter spent with Bukovsky and other circumstances surrounding the meeting highlighted Mondale's participation in it, not the President's.

Although White House officials said no attempt was made deliberately to downplay the significance of the meeting, it appeared that an effort was made not to allow it to inflame further Soviet displeasure with Carter's strong statements on human rights in the Soviet Union.

Eisele said the thrust of the conversation between Mondale and Bukovsky had to do with human rights. He said Bukovsky did not ask the United States to do anything specific in that regard and that he referred several times to the importance of understanding the "psychology of the So-

viet leaders and the Soviet people" in dealing with the issue.

Asked at one point by the Vice President what sustains the Soviet dissidents through adversity, Bukovsky replied, "First and foremost trust, faith in people, faith in the future and faith in the human values for which we stand."

As the Soviet dissident was being driven away from the White House, an officer of the Executive Protective Service charged across the grounds and became involved in a brief scuffle with a two-man camera crew from CBS. The crew had positioned itself on a patch of lawn that is usually off limits to reporters.

Handwritten notes:
S-1
37W
48

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
MAR 21 1977	
F.O.	

DATE 3-2-77

PAGE A-9

☒ THE WASHINGTON POST

☐ WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS

☐ THE NEW YORK TIMES

George F. Will

Carter's 'Tougher' Soviet Standard

When the Nazis crossed into Poland, in September 1939, the League of Nations was debating the need for a standard European railroad-crossing sign. A whimsical historian wonders if the League considered: "Caution: Nazis Crossing."

Today's skeptics assume that President Carter's efforts on behalf of human rights in the Soviet Union will be as ineffective as was the League of Nations' rhetoric. They are mistaken. Carter says that U.S. interests in human rights in the Soviet Union can be "severed" from such matters as trade and arms negotiations. He is mistaken.

By bringing the human rights issue to a state of simmer, Carter has made an official preoccupation of the Soviet Union's brutality. This preoccupation is bound to compel the United States to set for itself higher—which is to say, tougher—negotiating standards than it has had for the last six years.

Carter is not focusing attention on Soviet "internal affairs," nor on the Soviet government's contempt for the human rights provisions of its own "constitution." Rather, Carter is focusing attention on the Soviet Union's contemptuous disregard for international undertakings. With regard to the free movement of people and ideas, the Soviet Union is not being asked to do anything it has not repeatedly agreed to do.

The Soviet Union signed the Helsinki Agreement, with its human rights provisions, as it has signed similar multilateral pledges: strictly for propaganda value. When it did so, in 1975, it was secure in the knowledge that Secretary of State Kissinger would not make an issue of noncompliance. Now Carter has made noncompliance an issue. And even if he thinks the issue can be severed from, say, trade negotiations, it cannot be.

Expansion of U.S.-Soviet trade depends, in large measure, on Soviet compliance with the Jackson-Vanik amendment. It makes freer emigration from the Soviet Union a condition for granting the Soviet Union "most favored nation" trading status, and participation in U.S. credit programs. But the politi-

"Carter is focusing attention on (Russia's) contemptuous disregard for international undertakings."

cal climate Carter has created makes it impossible for him to do what many in his State Department would like to do, namely, seek repeal of the Jackson-Vanik amendment.

For a variety of reasons—population losses in the war, pressure on women to work, severe housing shortages—the Soviet Union faces a demographic crisis. It has a manpower shortage and a low birth rate. It needs to modernize and automate industry, especially agriculture, quickly. To do this, the Soviet Union needs U.S. trade; thus we have leverage to force some evolution of Soviet society.

The quickening evolution of Spain since Franco's death makes the Soviet Union an interesting anachronism. Of all the nations that were aligned with, or sympathetic to, Hitler in 1939, only the Soviet Union has a regime distinguished by its fundamental continuity with the regime of 1939.

If Carter wants a whiff of today's sulphurous Soviet regime, he should ask Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin for a copy of the Soviet film, "Secret and Open Things." It is one of the most important exercises in anti-Semitism since the death of Joseph Goebbels.

It opens with a blank screen, and a pistol shot. Then the narrator says: "That was how the Jewess Fanya Kaplan tried to kill Lenin." Thus begins a survey of Soviet "history" that is an incitement to anti-Semitism. It has been shown to Red Army groups as well as in public cinemas.

When German tanks are shown invading Russia, the narrator says: "Jewish capital helped Hitler to power." And the Soviet Union is not so "de-Stalinized" that it will discuss Trotsky (founder of the Red Army, and later Stalin's rival) as other than a sinister figure. In this film, his sinister nature is underscored by identifying him with his Jewish name, Bronstein.

Nature did not design the Soviet regime for anything other than coarseness. It has never tempered its ferocity with finesse. Thus, when it undertook to instruct President Carter not to meet with Vladimir Bukovsky, it described the exiled dissident as "scum," and pointedly said: "This information might be of interest to those who wish to converse with the renegade."

This clearly was Moscow instructing Carter not to meet with a Soviet dissident. Under the previous administration's policy of preemptive appeasement, such instructions were not needed, as Moscow knew and Solzhenitsyn learned.

5-2
3-2
2-2

SEARCHED _____ INDEXED _____
SERIALIZED _____ FILED _____
MAR 21 1977

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

DATE 3-3-77
PAGE A-23

THE WASHINGTON POST
WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS
THE NEW YORK TIMES